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The Quarles Public Safety Exception in Terrorism Cases:
Reviving the Marshall Dissent
ELIZABETH NIELSEN
I. INTRODUCTION

I

n the wake of the attempted car bombing in New York’s
Times Square on May 1, 2010, the decision to read
Miranda warnings to the suspect, Faisal Shahzad, ignited
a national debate. Republican leaders, such as Senator
John McCain, denounced the application of Miranda warnings.1 Senator Christopher Bond, the ranking Republican on
the Senate Intelligence Committee, criticized those who prioritized “protecting the privacy rights of these terrorists” over
intelligence gathering.2 Representative Peter T. King, the ranking Republican on the House Homeland Security Committee,
argued that terrorism suspects
should be deemed enemy combatants and “the first preference
should be a military commission because you can get more
information.” 3 While some
conservative commentators,
such as Glenn Beck, supported
Miranda rights for U.S. citizens,4 Senator Joseph Lieberman
called for legislation that would
deprive Americans of their
citizenship and related rights
“when they are apprehended and
charged with a terrorist act.”5
The Obama administration’s approach to the Shahzad
controversy evolved over time. Following his inauguration,
President Obama issued an executive order banning any interrogation techniques not already authorized in the U.S. Army Field
Manual and creating an interagency task force on interrogation.6
The task force recommended the creation of the High-Value
Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG), a specialized interagency
group that would be housed within the FBI and subject to the
oversight of the National Security Council.7 The primary goal
of the group would be gathering intelligence, as well as, “where
appropriate, to preserve the option of gathering information to
be used in potential criminal investigations and prosecutions.”8
Although members of the HIG assisted with the questioning
of Faisal Shahzad,9 the task force’s recommendations did not
reference Miranda rights.10
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The White House and Democratic leaders initially
supported the decision to read Shahzad his Miranda rights,
as they had done in previous controversies.11 Democrats
focused on the decision’s practical effects, maintaining that the
Miranda warnings did not impede law enforcement efforts.12
Representative Adam Smith explained, “We have proven in
this country for a long, long time that you can get very valuable information out of people after you Mirandize them.”13
Despite an initially strong stance on Miranda rights, however,
in May 2010, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. requested
legislation that would allow investigators greater flexibility to
interrogate terrorist suspects without informing them of their
rights.14 In a reference to New
York v. Quarles, which established a public safety exception
that permits law enforcement
officials to temporarily interrogate suspects without advising
them of their Miranda rights
when “reasonably prompted by
a concern for public safety,”15
Holder asked that the legislature
expand the public safety exception in terrorism-related cases.16
Although the administration did not produce a proposal
and no such legislation was
enacted, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a memorandum, dated October 21, 2010, that effectively implemented
Holder’s suggestions.17 The FBI Memorandum detailed FBI
policy regarding the use of Miranda warnings for custodial
interrogations of operational terrorists who have not been
indicted and are not represented by an attorney.18 In accordance
with the Quarles public safety exception, it advised agents to
ask questions that “are reasonably prompted by an immediate
concern for the safety of the public or the arresting agents” before administering Miranda warnings.19 The FBI Memorandum
instructed agents, in exceptional cases, to proceed with continued unwarned interrogation after exhausting the relevant
public safety questions when “necessary to collect valuable
and timely intelligence not related to any immediate threat.”20
The agents were advised to first consult with supervisors on
19

the understanding that “the government’s interest in obtaining
this intelligence outweighs the disadvantages of proceeding
with unwarned interrogation,” including the suppression of the
resulting statements at trial.21
Finally, the FBI Memorandum proposed that “[i]n light
of the magnitude and complexity of the threat often posed
by terrorist organizations, particularly international terrorist
organizations, and the nature of the attacks,” the interrogation
of an operational terrorist “may warrant significantly more
extensive public safety interrogation without Miranda warnings
than would be permissible in an ordinary criminal case.”22
Civil liberties and human rights organizations responded
with dismay. A coalition of thirty-five organizations sent a
letter to Holder stating, “[c]urrent law provides ample flexibility
to protect the public against imminent terrorist threats while
still permitting the use of statements made by the accused in a
criminal prosecution.”23 The coalition argued that an expansion
of the public safety exception “would undercut our fundamental
Fifth Amendment rights for no perceptible gain.”24
This Article will address the legal foundations of the
current debate over the Miranda rights of terrorist suspects,
focusing on the proposed expansion of the Quarles public safety
exception. Part II will discuss the development of the Miranda
doctrine, the emergence of the public safety exception, and
the impact of the Dickerson decision. Part III will address the
current scope of the public safety exception, including the circuit
split over the standard for both the factual basis for the concern
and the immediacy of the threat. Part IV will consider additional
exceptions to the Miranda doctrine, such as the admissibility
of derivative evidence, the use of statements for impeachment
purposes, certain types of overseas interrogations, and the public safety exception in the context of the Edwards rule, which
requires that questioning halt after suspects invoke their right
to an attorney. In light of these standards, Part V considers the
application of the current public safety exception to three high
profile terrorism cases: the 2008 coordinated bombing and
shooting attacks in Mumbai, the 2009 Christmas day bombing
attempt of a Detroit-bound airplane, and the 2010 attempted
car bombing in New York’s Times Square. Finally, Part VI
returns to Justice Marshall’s dissent in Quarles as support for
this Article’s conclusion that the public safety exception should
not be expanded. Where law enforcement officials determine
that immediate questioning is needed, they may, of course,
do so; this does not require, however, altering Miranda’s prohibition on the introduction of such statements at any criminal
trial of the person questioned.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court’s seminal Miranda v. Arizona
decision25 was the culmination of a decade’s long struggle
to define the meaning of an “involuntary” confession.
The Court’s previous jurisprudence primarily applied a “voluntariness doctrine” in the context of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 The doctrine considered the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether the defendant’s power of resistance was overcome by an excessively
coercive interrogation.27 However, there was no “talismanic
definition of ‘voluntariness,’ mechanically applicable to the
host of situations where the question has arisen.”28 Rather, the
Court has considered a multitude of factors, such as the condition of the suspect, isolation from others, the character of the
police conduct, and the length of the interrogation.29 As described
by Steven Penney, the Court’s pre-Miranda jurisprudence
was uneven and alternatively dominated by three, sometimes
overlapping, themes: the unreliability of confessions under
questionable circumstances, deterring abusive police practices,
and protecting the autonomy of the individual suspect.30
The challenges of the voluntariness doctrine reflected
the Court’s “internal disagreements concerning the proper
balancing of the interests of suspect and society.”31 In two
cases in 1964, the Court began to take a different approach.32 In
Massiah v. United States33 and Escobedo v. Illinois,34 the Court
invalidated two confessions under the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.35 Instead of requiring law enforcement officials to
refrain from unlawful interrogation practices, the Court imposed
an affirmative obligation to provide counsel to the suspect.36 The
majority in Escobedo was clear about the decision’s practical
effect on law enforcement efforts, stating:
No system worth preserving should have to fear that
if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he
will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the
exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is
something very wrong with that system.37
Shortly after the Massiah and Escobedo decisions, the
Supreme Court again reconsidered its confessions jurisprudence
in Miranda v. Arizona.38

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court changed course, signaling
clearer reliance on the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.39 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that a custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive and thus, “the prosecution
may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
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secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”40 These procedural safeguards include warnings of (1) the right to remain
silent, (2) the possibility that statements can and will be used
against the suspect in court, (3) the right to confer with counsel
before answering questions and to have counsel present, and
(4) the right of indigent suspects to appointed counsel.41 The
dissenting justices strongly rejected the constitutional basis for
the decision,42 which held that the scope of “compulsion” under
the Fifth Amendment is broader than “coercion” prohibited
under the Due Process Clause, and which imported a right to
counsel, addressed in the Sixth Amendment, into the Fifth
Amendment.43 Justice Harlan warned that the decision “entails
harmful consequences for the country at large,”44 predicting that
the effect of new warnings would be to “negate all pressure,
to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to
discourage any confession at all.”45

B. THE QUARLES PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION
While the dissenters in
Miranda predicted that dire
consequences would result
from its strict application,46 the
Court soon limited its reach
with a series of exceptions.47
In Harris v. New York,48 for
example, the Court allowed the
use of unwarned statements to
impeach a defendant.49 Shortly
thereafter, in Michigan v.
Tucker,50 the Court held that
derivative evidence from
unwarned statements are
admissible. 51 Most notably
for this discussion, in New
York v. Quarles, the Court
created a public safety exception to Miranda warnings.52
In New York v. Quarles, a young woman told police
officers that she had been raped and provided a description
of the rapist, including a statement that the accused had just
entered a supermarket carrying a gun.53 The officers apprehended the defendant in the supermarket and frisked him,
discovering that his shoulder holster was empty.54 Three officers
were present, and after handcuffing the defendant, one officer
asked him where the gun was.55 The defendant nodded towards
some empty cartons and responded, “[T]he gun is over there.”56
The officer retrieved a loaded .38-caliber revolver, placed the
defendant under arrest, and read him his Miranda rights.57 The
defendant waived his rights, confirmed that he owned the gun,
and stated the place of purchase.58 At trial, the Supreme Court
of New York excluded the defendant’s initial statement, “the

gun is over there,” as well as the gun itself, reasoning that the
officer had not read the defendant his Miranda warnings.59 The
trial court also excluded the defendant’s subsequent statements
as evidence tainted by the prior Miranda violation.60
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the case presented
a “situation where concern for public safety must be paramount
to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rule enunciated in Miranda.”61 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
engaged in a balancing test of the rights of the defendant with
the social cost of Miranda warnings, which he cautioned might
deter a suspect from responding to police questioning.62 Noting
that the primary social cost of Miranda warnings is generally
the possibility of fewer convictions, he argued that here the cost
would be the failure to obtain information necessary “to insure
that further danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public area.”63 Thus, the application of the
Miranda doctrine without exception would

Considering these practical

effects, the majority concluded
that absent actual coercion

by the officer, there was not

a constitutional imperative to

exclude evidence resulting from
such public safety questioning
without Miranda warnings.
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[P]lace officers . . . in the
untenable position of having to consider, often in a
matter of seconds, whether
it best serves society for
them to ask the necessary questions without the
Miranda warnings and
render whatever probative
evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to
give the warnings in order
to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might
uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability
to obtain that evidence and
neutralize the volatile situation confronting them.64

Considering these practical effects, the majority concluded
that absent actual coercion by the officer, there was not a constitutional imperative to exclude evidence resulting from such
public safety questioning without Miranda warnings.65 The
Court limited this Miranda exception to situations where law
enforcement officials are “reasonably prompted by a concern
for the public safety,”66 and when, distinguishing from Orozco
v. Texas,67 there is “exigency requiring immediate action
by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a
serious crime.”68 The test is objective rather than subjective, and
the “availability of that exception does not depend upon the
motivation of the individual officers involved.”69
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Marshall rejected
the factual assumption that the public was at risk during
21

the interrogation, noting that the defendant was unarmed,
handcuffed, and surrounded by four officers and that the store
was deserted at the time.70 He also objected to the application
of a balancing test at all and to the majority’s characterization
of the Miranda decision.71 Justice Marshall argued that the
social costs or benefits of Miranda warnings did not inform
the Miranda decision, which was instead “concerned with the
proscriptions of the Fifth Amendment.”72 He condemned the
majority’s “chimerical quest for public safety,” for creating an
inevitably confusing and controversial exception at the expense
of the clarity of the Miranda decision.73
Instead, Justice Marshall maintained that public safety could
be protected without abridging a suspect’s Fifth Amendment
rights.74 He stated:
If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise
imminently imperiled, the police are free to interrogate
suspects without advising them of their constitutional
rights. . . While the Fourteenth Amendment sets limits
on such behavior, nothing in the Fifth Amendment or
our decision in Miranda v. Arizona proscribes this sort of
emergency questioning. All the Fifth Amendment forbids
is the introduction of coerced statements at trial.75
Justice Marshall conceded that there was a potential cost
to his approach if a defendant’s incriminating statements were
excluded and the state had no independent proof of guilt.76 He
questioned, however, how often such statements would constitute “the crucial and otherwise unprovable element of a criminal
prosecution.”77 Regardless of the frequency of such incidents,
he maintained that “their regularity is irrelevant”: the Fifth
Amendment absolutely prohibits self-incrimination whether or
not the testimony is compelled to protect public safety.78
The Dickerson Decision and the Future of Post-Miranda
Jurisprudence
The language in Quarles raised questions about the
constitutional basis of the Miranda decision—namely whether
Miranda warnings are themselves constitutionally requisite,
or are merely “prophylactic” rules protecting constitutional
rights.79 The public safety exception to the warnings, and
similar exceptions for impeachment purposes80 and derivative
evidence,81 seemed to indicate that they were not mandated by
the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court repeatedly described
Miranda as a prophylactic decision that “sweeps more broadly
than the Fifth Amendment itself.”82 In 2000, the Court had the
opportunity to reconsider its Miranda decision. Two years after
the Miranda decision, an indignant Congress had responded by
enacting the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.83 Section 3501 of the act made all unwarned but voluntary statements by criminal suspects admissible in federal court,
returning to a pre-Miranda totality of the circumstances standard.84 The statute lay dormant until 1999, when the U.S. Court
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of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit revived Section 3501 to admit
a criminal defendant’s statement.85 The Fourth Circuit held that
Section 3501 overruled Miranda as it applied to federal law
enforcement officers, and thus unwarned confessions that met
the totality of circumstances test were admissible.86 The Supreme
Court decided to review the decision and—to the surprise of
many—reaffirmed the constitutional status of Miranda.87
In Dickerson v. United States,88 a 7-2 majority of the Court
held that, “Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this
Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress.”89
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had previously authored several
opinions describing the warnings as prophylactic,90 “concede[d]
that there is language in some of our opinions that supports the
view” that the warnings are not constitutionally requisite.91
However, he looked to the Court’s consistent application of the
Miranda requirement to the states over which it has no supervisory power92 and to the principles of stare decisis to ultimately
determine that Miranda is a constitutional decision that should
not be overturned.93 Rather, the Miranda warnings had “become
part of our national culture.”94
In his dissent, Justice Scalia objected to the majority’s
attempt to reconcile the numerous exceptions to Miranda
with its decision.95 He argued that, “if confessions procured in
violation of Miranda are confessions ‘compelled’ in violation
of the Constitution, the post-Miranda [decisions with exceptions] do not make sense.”96 In response, the majority asserted
the constitutional underpinnings of Miranda, but acknowledged
its inherent flexibility. Recognizing the exceptions to the rule,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, albeit in dicta, stated:
[N]o constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying
down a general rule can possibly foresee the various
circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it,
and the sort of modifications represented by these cases
[setting out exceptions to Miranda] are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision.97
The Dickerson decision created some uncertainty as to
the future of the Miranda exceptions. As Justice Scalia noted,
the majority never explicitly stated whether Miranda warnings
are themselves constitutionally required,98 yet the majority’s
description of Miranda as a “constitutional decision” was at
odds with the prophylactic line of cases.99 As stated by Professor
George C. Thomas III, “[i]f Miranda is best understood, in
light of Dickerson, as constitutional in the strong sense, the
exceptions and doctrinal limitations made on the authority
of the prophylactic theory seem doomed.”100 However, the majority in Dickerson indicated — in dicta, but in dicta that was
“subscribed to by a formidable majority of seven on the
Supreme Court”101 — that the status quo would continue despite its internal contradictions.102 That is, Dickerson appeared
to reaffirm both Miranda and the exceptions to Miranda’s rules
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that the Court had adopted in its previous cases.103 While the
Court has not yet revisited this issue, lower courts have continued to apply the public safety exception after the Dickerson
decision.104 Thus, it remains likely that, “although Dickerson
seemingly repudiated the premises on which some Mirandadebilitating decisions are based, the exceptions to Miranda will
remain in place.”105

III. CURRENT SCOPE OF THE QUARLES
PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION
While lower courts have continued to apply the Quarles
public safety exception in the wake of the Dickerson decision,
there has been a divergence among the circuits in articulating
the relevant standards. The Quarles majority limited the public
safety exception to situations where officials are “reasonably
prompted by a concern for the public safety,”106 and when there
is “exigency requiring immediate action by the officers beyond
the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime.”107 The
Courts of Appeals, however, have differed in their requirements
of both the factual basis for the concern and the immediacy of the
threat.108 The magnitude of the threat has not been a significant
factor in any circuit decision.

A. INHERENTLY DANGEROUS SITUATIONS
The Seventh, Ninth, First, and Eight Circuits have applied
the Quarles doctrine in inherently dangerous situations even
when the officers did not have actual knowledge of the presence
of a weapon, nor a specific reason to believe that the weapon’s
presence presents a danger to law enforcement officials or the
general public. For example, in United States v. Edwards,109
the Seventh Circuit considered an arrest involving known drug
dealers.110 The defendant and his passengers had been arrested
on narcotics charges, frisked, and handcuffed at the time an
officer asked if they had firearms.111 Edwards replied, “What
do I need a gun for,” since he was en route to a restaurant.112
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the admissibility of his statements, finding that the officers had an “objectively reasonable
need” to protect themselves “from any immediate danger that
a weapon would pose” because “drug dealers are known to
arm themselves.”113
The Eighth Circuit has taken a similar approach in applying
the public safety exception to inherently dangerous situations.
In United States v. Williams,114 the defendant was arrested at his
apartment on narcotics charges.115 After securing the premises,
the officers handcuffed Williams and asked him, “[I]s there
anything we need to be aware of?”116 Williams told them that
there was a gun in a closet.117 The court found that Quarles
applied because the officers “could not have known if any armed
individuals were present in the apartment or preparing to enter
Criminal Law Brief

the apartment within a short period of time,” or “whether other
hazardous weapons were present in the apartment that could
cause them harm if they happened upon them unexpectedly
or mishandled them in some way.”118 At the time of the
questioning, however, the apartment had been secured,119 and
the only information to support the presence of a weapon was
the defendant’s status as a narcotics dealer and that he had
“at one time” been accused of being a fugitive from a charge
involving use of a weapon.120
The Ninth Circuit has not required actual knowledge
of a threat or its immediacy. Instead, contrary to Quarles,121
the court has focused on the motivations of the officers. In
United States v. Brutzman,122 ten officials executed a search
warrant related to suspected mail and wire fraud.123 The officers
asked the defendant if any weapons were on the premises, and
the defendant admitted there was a shotgun in the closet.124 The
court focused exclusively on whether the officer’s questions
“‘arose from his concern with public safety’ and ‘his desire . . .
‘to obtain evidence of a crime.’”125 Noting the scope of the questioning,126 and that the presence of a weapon was completely
unrelated to the charge of mail and wire fraud, the court found
that the questions had a public safety purpose and fell within
the Quarles exception.127 The Ninth Circuit did not consider
whether the officers had actual knowledge of the presence of a
weapon, or the immediacy of a threat.128 The court has asserted
that “a pressing need for haste is not essential” in determining
whether the public safety exception applies.129
The First Circuit similarly ignores the immediacy of the
threat as a factor. In United States v. Fox,130 the defendant was
pulled over during a traffic stop.131 The officer recognized
the defendant from a previous arrest that had included brass
knuckles and a concealed firearm, and noticed “a large bulge”
in his coat pocket.132 The officer frisked the defendant, revealing
brass knuckles and an unused shotgun shell.133 The officer asked
if there was a gun in the car, which the defendant denied.134
After the defendant was in the police car, the officer asked
again about weapons, and the defendant gave their location.135
The court concluded that the brass knuckles and shotgun shell
provided actual knowledge of a threat, and found that the officer
had “ample knowledge to fear for his own safety” to justify
the Quarles exception even though the officers had secured
the vehicle.136
These positions have created some division within the
federal courts. For example, in a concurring opinion, Judge
Raymond Gruender on the Eighth Circuit took issue with
the majority’s neglect of the immediacy requirement.137 While
ultimately concurring with the majority, out of deference to circuit precedent, Judge Gruender noted that the Quarles majority
explicitly denounced extending the exception to the mishandling of weapons in its discussion of the Orozco decision.138
Although Orozco also involved a missing gun,139 the Quarles
23

Court distinguished the case because there was no “exigency
requiring immediate action by the officers beyond the normal
need expeditiously to solve a serious crime.”140 Judge Gruender
suggested that a fair reading of the Quarles opinion would limit
the exception to situations where “(1) an immediate danger to
the police officers or the public exists, or (2) when the public
may later come upon a weapon and thereby create an immediately dangerous situation.”141 As seen below, this position has
been adopted by other Courts of Appeals.

B. REASONABLE FACTUAL BASIS AND IMMEDIACY
OF THE THREAT
In contrast to the positions of the other circuit courts, the
Sixth, Tenth, Fourth, Fifth, and Second Circuits have adopted
a narrower public safety exception to Miranda warnings. As
summarized by Judge Lynch, the decisions of these courts
are more likely to rest “on specific reliable information that
a weapon was present, and a
specific reason to think that
the location of the gun posed a
concrete danger to the public.”142
The Sixth Circuit has created a formal test for applying
the public safety exception. As
established in United States v.
Williams,143 and later adopted
by the Tenth Circuit,144 the court
limits the exception to situations
where an officer has a “reason
to believe (1) that the defendant
might have (or recently have had)
a weapon, and (2) that someone
other than police might gain
access to that weapon and inflict
harm with it.”145 The knowledge
must be based on “articulable
fact[s] at [the officer’s] disposal”
at the time.146 Factors satisfying the first prong may include
whether the suspect had a history
of violence, was involved with drugs, exhibited evidence of a
weapon, or had recently been seen with a weapon.147 The second
prong is more difficult to establish because the factual circumstances are more limited.148 For example, the court in Williams
explained that the exception might apply if the defendant were
unrestrained and heading towards the possible location of a
weapon.149 If a defendant were handcuffed and out of reach of
a weapon, however, the officers “plainly could not have had an
objectively reasonable fear for their safety,” and the exception
would not apply.150

The Fourth Circuit has taken a similar approach in earlier
cases. In United States v. Mobley,151 the court considered an
arrest where agents asked whether “there was anything in the
apartment that could be of danger to the agents who would be
staying to conduct the search warrant, such as a weapon.”152
Since the apartment had been secured and Mobley was the only
person present besides the agents, the court found that there
was “no demonstration of an ‘immediate need’ that would
validate protection under the Quarles exception.”153 Analogous
to the second prong of the Sixth Circuit’s test in Williams,154 the
Fourth Circuit held that “[a]bsent other information, a suspicion
that weapons are present in a particular setting is not enough,
as a general matter, to demonstrate an objectively reasonable
concern for immediate danger to police or public.”155 Noting that
Quarles is “an exception to the Miranda rule,” the court warned
against applying it in “an ordinary and routine arrest scenario.”156
The Fifth Circuit has addressed related concerns, limiting
its application of the public safety
exception. In United States v.
Raborn,157 police officers pulled
over a narcotics suspect.158 The
defendant stepped out of his truck
wearing a holstered pistol, which
an officer saw him remove and
place inside the truck.159 The officers, who were unable to find the
gun, asked the defendant where it
was located and he stated that it
was under the seat cover.160 As the
officers were aware of the presence of the gun, the court focused
on the immediacy of the threat.161
Since the officers had seized
the truck and there was no immediate danger of someone other
than police gaining access to
the weapon, the court held that
the Quarles exception did not
apply.162 Since the Raborn decision, the Fifth Circuit has firmly
held that “[w]hen the danger inherent in a confrontation has
passed, so has the basis for the [public safety] exception.”163
Finally, the Second Circuit requires “sufficient indicia
supporting an objectively reasonable need to protect the police
or the public from immediate harm.”164 For example, in United
States v. Estrada,165 officers executed an arrest warrant for
a drug dealer with a criminal record that included assault
convictions.166 After handcuffing the suspect, an officer asked
about the location of any weapons, and the defendant stated
that there was a gun in the pocket of a jacket.167 For actual

There is no doubt that while
a loaded handgun in a

crowded supermarket or in the
possession of an unrestrained
accomplice may threaten the
safety to the general public
or officers on the scene, a

terrorist in possession of a

dirty bomb presents a threat
of a different nature.
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knowledge, the court looked to the defendant’s criminal history,
which showed that he “was capable of violence,” and his status
as a drug dealer and concluded that it was a reasonable inference
that weapons were present in the apartment.168 Regarding immediacy, the court found this existed in the officers’ knowledge
that an additional person, a co-resident of the apartment, was
also present during the arrest.169

C. MAGNITUDE OF THE THREAT
Since the majority of cases involving a public safety exception to Miranda involve missing firearms, there has been little
discussion of whether the magnitude of the threat affects the
Quarles analysis. Thus, the proposal in the FBI memorandum
that the public safety exception be expanded based on “the
magnitude and complexity of the threat often posed by terrorist
organizations, particularly international terrorist organizations,
and the nature of their attacks”170 presents a novel argument.
There is no doubt that while a loaded handgun in a crowded
supermarket or in the possession of an unrestrained accomplice
may threaten the safety to the general public or officers on the
scene, a terrorist in possession of a dirty bomb presents a threat
of a different nature.
The few cases addressing such scenarios have not explicitly
taken into consideration the magnitude of the potential threat.
For example, in United States v. Khalil, discussed in greater detail in Part V, the Second Circuit considered the questioning of
an accused terrorist with respect to a bomb that was discovered
in his apartment.171 The court’s discussion of the Quarles exception was limited to the officer’s questioning of the defendant as
to whether he intended to kill himself in the bombing, reasoning that the defendant’s “vision as to whether or not he would
survive his attempt to detonate the bomb had the potential for
shedding light on the bomb’s stability.”172 Since the questioning was supported by an objectively reasonable need to protect
the police and the public from a specific, imminent threat—the
agents were already in possession of a ticking time bomb—the
public safety exception applied. As noted later by Judge Lynch
in Jones, “In Khalil, the exigent risks to public safety were
more extreme even than in Quarles itself, and the Court made
clear that the acceptability of the questioning was to be tested
in light of its relevance to that exigency.”173 Thus, despite the
interests at stake, the court focused on the nexus between the
questioning and the specific threat, and did not address whether
the magnitude of the threat alone justified an expansion to the
exception.174
The court’s framework may determine the magnitude of the
potential threat on the court’s reasoning in future cases. Courts
that apply the Quarles doctrine in inherently dangerous situations might consider the magnitude of the threat as relevant to
determining the nature of the situation. For example, courts that
have relied primarily on the defendant’s status as a known drug
Criminal Law Brief

dealer to apply a public safety exception without knowledge of
the presence of a weapon or a reason to believe that the weapon
presents a danger,175 would take a similarly expansive approach
to a suspect’s status as a known terrorist. In contrast, courts that
have applied a narrower exception are more likely to continue
to require both actual knowledge of a specific threat as well as
a reason to believe that the threat poses an immediate danger
to the public regardless of its magnitude. Since many of these
cases, including Khalil, were decided before the September 11,
2001 attacks,176 however, it remains to be seen whether courts
will adapt these standards when considering the magnitude of
the threat in future terrorism cases.

IV. ADDITIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE
MIRANDA DOCTRINE
The Quarles public safety exception is one of only several
other exceptions to the Miranda doctrine. For example, even
where a statement is excluded from the Government’s case-inchief based on improper Miranda warnings, the statement may
be used for impeachment purposes if the defendant testifies.177
Additionally, there is no “fruit of the poisonous tree” rule for
Miranda violations,178 and hence any derivative evidence may
be introduced in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Furthermore,
Miranda generally does not apply to interrogations conducted
by foreign officials.179 Finally, if a suspect invokes his Miranda
rights, a public safety exception may still apply to the resulting statements and derivative evidence when there are exigent
circumstances.180

A. ADMISSIBILITY FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES
A statement that is inadmissible under Miranda may
nonetheless be introduced to impeach the defendant’s
testimony.181 Such an exception was seemingly rejected by
the Miranda Court, which said that the rules applied to all improperly obtained statements, including “direct confessions,”
“statements which amount to ‘admissions’ of part or all of an
offense,” or “statements alleged to be merely ‘exculpatory.”’182
The Court noted that allegedly exculpatory statements are often
used to impeach the defendant’s testimony at trial, finding that
“[t]hese statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense
of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and
effective waiver required for any other statement.”183
In 1971, however, the Court established an exception for
impeachment use of statements taken in violation of Miranda.184
In Harris v. New York,185 a police officer failed to fulfill the
Miranda requirements when he failed to warn the suspect he
had a right to appointed counsel if he could not afford counsel.186 At trial, the prosecution conceded that the resulting
statements were not admissible and made no effort to use them
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in its case-in-chief.187 The prosecution used the statements
for impeachment of the defendant, however, and the jury was
instructed that it should consider these statements “only in
passing on [the defendant’s] credibility and not as evidence of
guilt.”188 The Court held that the prosecution’s use of the statement to impeach the defendant’s testimony was permissible.189
Harris was met with controversy at the time,190 nonetheless
the Court has since reaffirmed its position.191 Justice Marshall
acknowledged the vitality of the Harris decision in his dissent
to Quarles, emphasizing the jury instructions that the statement not be considered as evidence of guilt.192 While courts
have disagreed over impeachment use when law enforcement
officials deliberately violated the Miranda rule,193 the impeachment exception remains valid.194

B. ADMISSIBILITY OF DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE
The Court held, pre-Dickerson, that the failure to give a
suspect Miranda warnings does not require the suppression
of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary
statements.195 For example, the Court permitted the introduction of testimony from a witness discovered solely because of
an unwarned statement in Michigan v. Tucker,196 and a written
confession obtained after Miranda warnings cured a previous
unwarned interrogation in Oregon v. Elstad.197 Since these
rulings were based on a prophylactic view of the rules rejected
in the Dickerson decision, the future of the derivative evidence
exception seemed unclear immediately after Dickerson, even
though, Dickerson, in dicta, reaffirmed both Miranda and the
exceptions to Miranda.198
The Court resolved the confusion over the continued
legitimacy of the derivative evidence exception in United
States v. Patane.199 In Patane, an officer attempted to advise the
defendant of his Miranda rights, but the defendant interrupted,
asserting that he knew his rights.200 The officer then asked about
the location of the defendant’s pistol, and retrieved it.201 The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the suppression of the pistol, reasoning
that Tucker and Elstad were incompatible with the Dickerson
ruling.202 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the SelfIncrimination Clause is not implicated by the admission into
evidence of the physical fruit of an unwarned but otherwise
voluntary statement.203 Adopting a distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence that had been advocated by
Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion to Quarles,204 the
Court in Patane held that “‘the word ‘witness’ in the constitutional text limits the’ scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause
to testimonial evidence.”205 Thus, “the exclusion of unwarned
statements . . . is a complete and sufficient remedy” for Miranda
violations,206 and the Self-Incrimination Clause is not violated
by the introduction of non-testimonial evidence obtained as a
result of the statements, including Patane’s pistol.207 The Court
stated that “nothing in Dickerson, including its characterization
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of Miranda as announcing a constitutional rule,” changed any
of its observations.208
The ruling in Patane is limited, however, to physical fruit
of otherwise voluntary statements that were taken without full
Miranda warnings.209 Significantly for terrorism cases, evidence
derived from statements made under duress—that is, statements
that are coerced—is not admissible, prohibited not by Miranda,
but by the text of the Fifth Amendment itself.210 For example,
just this year, in United States v. Ghailani,211 a judge in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York had before
him a defendant charged with supplying the explosives used
to bomb U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya more than a
decade ago.212 The defendant alleged that he had suffered physical and psychological abuse at the hands of his interrogators,
and the Government asked the court to assume for the purposes
of the motion that the defendant’s statements while in CIA
custody were coerced in violation of the Fifth Amendment.213
Judge Kaplan held that the testimony of a witness whom the
government identified from Ghailani’s statements was not
admissible.214 In cases where a statement is obtained through
coercion, the court held, the Fifth Amendment prohibits the
use of the statement or any derivative evidence—testimonial or
non-testimonial—unless the evidence “‘has been come at . . .
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint.’”215

C. ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS TO FOREIGN
OFFICIALS
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the extraterritorial application of the Miranda doctrine, lower courts
have held that some form of Miranda warnings is required
for overseas custodial interrogations conducted by American
officials,216 albeit with some disagreement over the scope of the
protections.217 The courts have not, however, applied Miranda
to overseas interrogations conducted by foreign officials unless
there was substantial participation by U.S. personnel. But, if
the interrogation tactics are so severe as to “shock the judicial
conscience,” the resulting statements are coerced in violation of
the Fifth Amendment and are inadmissible.218
To determine whether there has been substantial participation of American officials, courts have applied the joint
venture doctrine.219 The first prong of the doctrine provides that
“evidence obtained through activities of foreign officials,
in which federal agents substantially participated and which
violated the accused’s Fifth Amendment or Miranda rights,
must be suppressed in a subsequent trial in the United States.”220
The second prong prevents U.S. officers from using local agents
to perform a custodial interrogation “in order to circumvent the
requirements of Miranda.”221 Demonstrating that the foreign
officials had their own interest in the matter may satisfy this
requirement.222
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The precise requirements of the joint venture test remain
unclear. While the presence of U.S. officials at an interrogation
is not sufficient unless they participate in some way,223 there is
not a clear standard for the requisite level of participation. For
example, in United States v. Abu Ali,224 the Fourth Circuit split
on whether there was a joint venture.225 Saudi Arabian officials
had interrogated the defendant using some of the questions
supplied by U.S. officials.226 Noting that the Saudi interrogators “determined what questions would be asked, determined
the form of the questions, and set the length of the interrogation,” thus remaining in control of the investigation,227 Judges
Wilkinson and Traxler were convinced that the American
officials were not trying to evade the strictures of Miranda.228
They also argued that a broad
application of Miranda protections
would frustrate allies, creating
an “unwarranted hindrance to
international cooperation.” 229
In contrast, Judge Motz found
that providing the questions to
be asked by cooperating foreign
officials constituted sufficient
participation to establish a joint
venture.230 She cautioned that the
majority’s view “permits United
States law enforcement officers
to strip United States citizens
abroad of their constitutional
rights simply by having foreign
law enforcement officers ask the
questions.”231
While Miranda warnings
do not apply to overseas interrogations conducted by foreign
officials, the resulting statements
are inadmissible if they have been
coerced in violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause or the Due
Process Clause. U.S. courts conduct a voluntariness analysis
to determine whether the defendant’s due process rights have
been violated.232 When the interrogation tactics were so severe
as to “shock the judicial conscience,” the court may exclude
the resulting evidence.233 In very rare cases, coercive interrogations by foreign officials may taint later interrogations by U.S.
officials, even when they first administer Miranda warnings.234
Given the standard’s high bar, which is generally limited to
tactics amounting to torture, and the evidentiary challenges of
proving acts committed overseas in environments controlled
by foreign officials, most defendants are unlikely to meet this
burden. Courts have become increasingly open to the participation of foreign officials, taking novel steps such as allowing for
a live, two-way video link for overseas depositions of foreign

officials.235 The majority of statements taken by foreign officials
without substantial participation by U.S. personnel are likely to
be admitted in future cases, even though no Miranda rights were
given. Again, however, statements that “shock the conscience”
or otherwise violate the defendant’s due process rights will not
be admitted, even if obtained from foreign sources.

D. THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION IN THE
CONTEXT OF AN EDWARDS VIOLATION
Another possible exception to the Miranda doctrine occurs in
the context of a violation of the Edwards rule, which requires that
questioning cease after a suspect invokes his right to counsel.236
While the Supreme Court has never considered whether the
public safety exception applies to
Edwards situations, two courts of
appeals have determined that the
Quarles exception applies.237
The Ninth Circuit was the
first appellate court to determine
that a public safety exception
applies to excuse an Edwards
violation.238 In United States v.
DeSantis, 239 officers executed an
arrest warrant at the defendant’s
apartment.240 DeSantis maintained
that after he was read his Miranda
rights, he asked to call his attorney
and was refused.241 He then asked
to change his clothes in another
room.242 The officers asked if
weapons were present in the room,
and he told them that there was a
gun in the closet.243 In addressing the defendant’s suppression
motion, the court faced the question
of whether “the considerations
undergirding Quarles necessitate relaxation of certain procedural safeguards enunciated in Edwards v. Arizona.”244 The
court answered in the affirmative, finding the same considerations in Quarles “that allow the police to dispense with
providing Miranda warnings in a public-safety situation would
permit them to dispense with the prophylactic safeguard that
forbids initiating further questioning of an accused who requests
counsel.”245 Since the officers were legally entitled to question
DeSantis about the location of weapons for their own safety, the
statements and the gun were admissible.246
In United States v. Mobley, the Fourth Circuit confronted
similar facts.247 FBI agents arrested the defendant at his home
and “Mobley had answered the door naked, and it was quite
apparent that he was unarmed.”248 After being advised of his
Miranda rights, Mobley invoked his right to counsel.249 Agents
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then asked if there were weapons present, and Mobley admitted that there was a gun in a closet.250 The court denied his
suppression motion, holding that the public safety exception
should be extended to Edwards cases.251 The Fourth Circuit,
however, declined to extend the new exception to the facts
before it in Mobley, where the defendant had been encountered naked, the FBI had already made a security sweep of the
premises, and there were no other individuals present.252 Thus,
the court found that, although “the public safety exception is a
valid and completely warranted exception to the Miranda and
Edwards rules, we are persuaded that there was no demonstration of an ‘immediate need’ that would validate protection
under the Quarles exception in this instance.”253
While not specifically addressing this issue, the Supreme
Court has allowed for other exceptions to the Edwards rule.254
For example, the Court held in Oregon v. Hass that statements
made after a suspect invokes his right to counsel may be used to
impeach contrary trial testimony.255 Although Hass was decided
before Edwards, the Court has since reaffirmed the impeachment exception. In Michigan v. Harvey,256 the Court stated that
“Hass was decided 15 years ago, and no new information [that
an impeachment exception diminishes the deterrent effect of
excluding the statements from the prosecution’s case-in-chief]
has come to our attention which should lead us to think otherwise now.”257 And although rulings extending the Quarles
exception to the Edwards rule are thus far confined to two
circuit courts, it appears likely that other courts will find the
Edwards rule susceptible to public safety arguments.258

V. CASE STUDIES: THE PUBLIC SAFETY
EXCEPTION AND TERRORISM
A. PIPE BOMBS IN BROOKLYN: ABU MEZER
The Abu Mezer case epitomizes the ticking time bomb
scenario. In July 1997, Abdelrahman Mossabah was living
with two roommates, Abu Mezer and Khalil, in an apartment in
Brooklyn, New York.259 Abu Mezer, who was angered by the
situation between Israel and Palestine, showed Mossabah pipe
bombs in the apartment and shared his plans to detonate them
in a crowded subway or bus terminal.260 Mossabah panicked
and approached Long Island Rail police, trying to explain what
he had seen.261 He provided police officers with a key to the
apartment and a diagram of its layout and the location of the
bombs.262
In the raid on the apartment, Abu Mezer lunged for the first
officer and grabbed for his gun, while Khalil crawled toward a
black bag containing the bombs.263 Officers shot and wounded
both men, who were handcuffed and taken to the hospital.264
Technicians examined the black bag and found pipe bombs
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with one of the switches already flipped, and “were concerned
that the bomb would explode before they could disarm it.”265
Officers at the hospital asked Abu Mezer a series of questions
about the make of the bombs and the procedure for disarming
them, and he answered all of the questions.266 Officers also
asked him if he planned to kill himself in the explosion, to
which he responded, “Poof.”267
Later that afternoon, officers read Abu Mezer his Miranda
rights and he continued to respond to questions.268 He explained
his motivations for the attack, his associations with terrorist
organizations, his preparations and plans for the bombing, and
his hopes for future attacks.269 He also stated that when he realized the police were in his apartment, “he had wanted to blow
himself up.”270
At trial, the defendant did not question the applicability
of Quarles, except as applied to his statement in response to
questioning about whether he intended to kill himself in the
bombing.271 In a brief discussion, the Second Circuit found that
Abu Mezer’s “vision as to whether or not he would survive his
attempt to detonate the bomb had the potential for shedding
light on the bomb’s stability.”272 The questioning fell within the
public safety exception and the resulting statement was admissible.273 As noted by Judge Lynch, the Khalil decision did “little
to test the limits of the Quarles exception,” because “the exigent
risks to public safety were more extreme even than in Quarles
itself.”274 He explained that “confronted with a bomb that might
or might not be about to explode, no rational person could think
that the police, before questioning the bomb’s maker about its
characteristics, must advise the bomber in effect that it behooves
him to consult counsel before answering.”275

B. THE CHRISTMAS DAY BOMBER:
UMAR FAROUK ABDULMUTALLAB
On December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
a Nigerian national, was a passenger on a flight from Amsterdam
to Detroit, Michigan.276 There were 279 passengers and eleven
crew members.277 Abdulmutallab was carrying a concealed
bomb designed to allow detonation at the time of his choosing.278 Shortly before landing, he disappeared into the bathroom
for twenty minutes.279 When he returned, he pulled a blanket
over himself and passengers then heard popping noises and saw
his pant leg and part of the wall catch on fire.280 Passengers and
flight crew intervened, extinguishing the fire and restraining
him.281 A flight attendant asked Abdulmutallab what was in his
pocket, and he responded “explosive device.”282 After landing,
he was taken into custody and received medical treatment.283
Once he was in custody, the FBI questioned Abdulmutallab
for about fifty minutes without reading his Miranda rights.284
During questioning, one source said that Abdulmutallab warned
of other terrorism attacks, stating that, “[o]thers were following
me.”285 The interrogation lasted until he was taken into surgery
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for the burns he sustained.286 After surgery, a second team of
FBI agents reportedly attempted to continue questioning, but
Abdulmutallab stopped cooperating and, in consultation with
four government agencies, interrogators read his Miranda
warnings.287 Days after the attempted bombing, FBI agents traveled to Nigeria and worked to gain the trust of Abdulmutallab’s
relatives.288 On January 17, 2010, FBI agents returned with two
family members who conveyed to him that they “had complete
trust in the U.S. system” and they believed he “would be treated
fairly.”289 Senior administration officials said that he began
talking again, and has been cooperating on a daily basis and
providing actionable intelligence.290
His trial is still in the pre-trial stage, although
Abdulmutallab, who is representing himself, has inquired about
the possibility of a guilty plea.291 Given the substantial forensic
evidence and number of eyewitnesses, the prosecution would
be unlikely to depend on his statements —either those before
after the Miranda warnings—at trial. Neither the complaint nor
the indictment references the statements, referring instead to the
overwhelming evidence from the scene.292

C. THE TIMES SQUARE BOMBER: FAISAL SHAHZAD
On May 1, 2010, a car was discovered abandoned on
the street in New York’s Times Square.293 Inside the car were
“multiple, filled propane tanks, gasoline canisters, and fertilizer — as well as fireworks, clocks, wiring, and other items.”294
By the time emergency services workers arrived, the vehicle
was visibly smoking.295 An investigation revealed that Faisal
Shahzad bought the car, that one of the keys in the vehicle
opened the door to his residence, and that he used a pre-paid
cellular telephone to call a fireworks store and receive a series
of calls from Pakistan after his purchase of the vehicle.296
On May 3, 2010, Shahzad was arrested at the John F.
Kennedy International Airport.297 After his arrest, joint terrorism task force agents and officers from the New York Police
Department interviewed Shahzad for three or four hours before
reading him his Miranda rights.298 The Deputy Director of
the FBI, John S. Pistole, described Shahzad as “cooperative,”
stating that he provided “valuable intelligence and evidence.”299
After investigators determined there was not an imminent
threat, Shahzad was read his Miranda rights and waived
them.300 He then “continued to cooperate and provide valuable
information.”301
According to the complaint, after his arrest, Shahzad admitted
to attempting to detonate a bomb in Times Square, and that
he had recently received bomb-making training in Waziristan,
Pakistan.302 The complaint does not state whether he made these
statements before or after he was read the Miranda warnings,303
although he could also have reaffirmed the statements after the
warnings. Hours after his arrest, there were reports of seven
or eight additional arrests in Pakistan.304 While there were no
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official statements linking the arrests to Shahzad’s statements,
commentators, such as former Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrew
C. McCarthy, argued that “the information supporting these
arrests almost certainly came from Shahzad.”305 The government’s sentencing memorandum states that after Shahzad
waived his Miranda rights, he stated, “among other things, that
he believed his bomb would have killed at least 40 people, and
that, if he had not been arrested, he planned to detonate a second
bomb in New York City two weeks later.”306
Shahzad ultimately pled guilty to all ten counts of the
indictment,307 so the court never ruled on the scope of the public
safety exception as applied in his case.

VI. CONCLUSION: REVIVING JUSTICE MARSHALL’S
DISSENT TO QUARLES
Despite the claims that the Quarles public safety exception
should be expanded, Justice Marshall’s assertion that public safety
can be protected with abridging a suspect’s Fifth Amendment
rights remains valid. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, some commentators predicted that the Miranda could not
survive in the context of terrorism. William Stuntz cautioned:
Terrorists tend not to be easily cowed or confused;
they are therefore less likely to agree to talk to the
police than are average suspects. The consequence
is that Miranda’s invocation rule, which caused only
distributive injustice before September 11, risks causing homicides after that date. Of course, the police
can prevent that result by ignoring the invocation rule,
but that has a high price as well: Suspects who maybe
guilty of terrible crimes may be effectively immune
from prosecution.308
Thus, Miranda, which had “seemed unshakeable,” may now be “untenable.”309

So far, however, this has not proven to be the case. As seen
in the examples of Abu Mezer, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
and Faisal Shahzad, some terrorist suspects have willingly
provided information after, as well as before, receiving Miranda
warnings.310 Mezer explained to officers how to defuse the pipe
bombs he had constructed, and continued to provide detailed
information after hearing his Miranda rights.311 Abdulmutallab
initially provided information after his arrest.312 While he ceased
cooperating after his surgery, he resumed under the influence
of relatives the FBI had flown from Nigeria.313 Shahzad also
cooperated with authorities and waived his Miranda rights.314
In fact, since September 11, 2001, federal authorities have
resolved nearly 700 terrorism-associated prosecutions,315 which
have included significant numbers of cooperators, informants,
and guilty pleas.316
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The preexisting legal framework provides sufficient flexibility for successful terrorism investigations, intelligence
operations, and prosecutions. As argued by Justice Marshall,
public safety may be protected without creating an exception
to Miranda or abridging a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights.317
He stated:
If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise
imminently imperiled, the police are free to interrogate
suspects without advising them of their constitutional
rights. . . . While the Fourteenth Amendment sets limits
on such behavior, nothing in the Fifth Amendment or
our decision in Miranda v. Arizona proscribes this sort of
emergency questioning. All the Fifth Amendment forbids
is the introduction of coerced statements at trial.318
The courts have continuously upheld Justice Marshall’s
position that a suspect’s Fifth
Amendment rights are not
violated by an unwarned interrogation unless the resulting
statements are introduced at
trial. 319 Furthermore, courts
recognize that officials conduct
unwarned interrogations for
intelligence purposes. 320 As
stated by Judge Sand, “[t]o the
extent that a suspect’s Miranda
rights allegedly impede [intelligence] collection, we note that Miranda only prevents an
unwarned or involuntary statement from being used as evidence
in a domestic criminal trial; it does not mean that such statements are never to be elicited in the first place.”321
As Justice Marshall recognized, there will be potential
costs to this approach if excluded incriminating statements
constitute “the crucial and otherwise unprovable element of a
criminal prosecution.”322 However, he rightly questioned the
frequency of such scenarios. In the case studies examined in this
Article, the Government had sufficient independent evidence
without the defendants’ incriminating statements. For Abu
Mezer, the government had the pipe bombs in his bedroom, the
testimony of his roommate, and his assault on a police officer.323
Abdulmutallab was literally captured with a smoking bomb on
his person, and the government had access to an airplane full
of eyewitnesses.324 Shahzad purchased the vehicle he used as
a car bomb, one of the keys in the vehicle opened the door
to his residence, and he placed calls to a fireworks store and
received a series of calls from Pakistan after his purchase of
the vehicle.325 While additional incriminating statements would
certainly have bolstered each case, the efficacy of a prosecution

is not sufficient to overcome the Fifth Amendment prohibition
on self-incrimination.
In addition to the public safety exception, the Supreme
Court has developed numerous other exceptions to the prescriptions of Miranda.326 As described in Part IV, these include
the admissibility of derivative evidence, the use of statements
to impeach the defendant, certain types of overseas interrogations, and the public safety exception even where the defendant
has invoked his Edwards rights. In the case of Faisal Shahzad,
arguably the weakest in the terms of independent evidence,
these exceptions could have significantly affected the prosecution. For example, even if his statements were excluded,
any derivative evidence could have been introduced into the
prosecution’s case-in-chief. Shahzad reportedly stated that he
received bomb-making training in Waziristan, Pakistan.
Without introducing this statement, the Government could
have questioned witnesses who
accompanied Shahzad on the
trip or attended the training in
Pakistan. If Shahzad testified at
trial, the statements themselves,
potentially including his admission of guilt, could be used
for impeachment purposes. If,
hypothetically, Shazad had been
overseas and foreign officials
had interrogated him there,
Miranda might not apply at all. And, even if he invoked his
rights during the interrogation, the public safety exception as
spelled out by the courts (without any expansion as proposed by
the Department of Justice [footnote to supra]) might still apply
to permit admission of his statements.
Nearly thirty years after the Quarles decision, Justice
Marshall’s opposition to the creation of a public safety
exception is largely academic. Having survived the Dickerson
decision, some form of the Quarles public safety exception is
here to stay. The basic principles Justice Marshall articulated,
however, cautions against a legislative or judicial expansion of
the exception in the context of terrorism cases.327 Officers may
conduct an unwarned interrogation to identify or stop terrorist
activity when there is not an immediate threat to public safety,
but the Fifth Amendment requires that the resulting statements
be inadmissible for prosecution. Prosecutors may avail themselves of other evidence as well as the many other exceptions
to the Miranda doctrine.
I propose that the courts should continue to interpret the
public safety exception within the confines of reasonableness
and exigency as articulated in the Quarles decision. In the context of terrorism, a public safety exception based on the inherent
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dangerousness of the situation could well render Miranda rights
meaningless—making Quarles the “narrow exception” that
swallows the rule in terrorist trials. Even the broader interpretations of the exception by the courts have limited the scope
and duration of the inquiry. The exception does not grant law
enforcement officials “an automatic right to interrogate suspects” without Miranda warnings simply because it is possible
that terrorism is involved.328 Rather, at a minimum, when the
authorities are “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety,”329 and when there is “exigency requiring immediate action by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to
solve a serious crime,”330 there should be a factual basis for both
the specific concern and the immediacy of the threat. The public
safety exception should remain within the limits envisioned by
the Quarles court: a narrow exception “circumscribed to by the
[public safety] exigency which justifies it.”331
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York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953) (stating “[t]he limits in any case depend upon
a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance
of the person confessing. What would be overpowering to the weak of will
or mind might be utterly ineffective against an experienced criminal.”).
28
Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (examining
the Court’s jurisprudence on confessions for assistance in assessing the
voluntariness of a Fourth Amendment consent search).
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See Sidney M. McCrackin, Note, New York v. Quarles: The Public
Safety Exception to Miranda, 59 tUl. l. rev. 1111, 1112 (1985); Yale
Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We
Needed It, How We Got It — And What Happened to It, 5 ohio st. J. Crim.
l. 163, 163 (2007).
30
See Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical
View, 25 am. J. Crim. l. 309, 313 (1998).
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Lesley A. Lunney, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis
Consequences, 48 Cath. U. l. rev. 727, 735 (1999).
32
See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (holding the prosecution could not use the defendant’s self-incriminating statements against
him because they were deliberately elicited outside the presence of an
attorney after the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (finding violation of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel when police questioned the defendant after denying his request for
counsel); but see id. at 497–98 (White, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s
“new approach” which conflated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and ignored
that prior cases involving the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “dealt with
the requirement of counsel at proceedings in which definable rights could be
won or lost, not with stages where probative evidence might be obtained.”).
33
Massiah, 377 U.S. at 201.
34
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 478.
35
See Massiah, 377 U.S at 206; Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490–91.
36
See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 496 (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority’s rule by declaring it “wholly unworkable and impossible to
administer unless police cars are equipped with public defenders and undercover agents and police informants have defense counsel at their side”).
37
Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
38
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39
Id. at 471 (reasoning that if the constitution guarantees the right to counsel
for trial independent of a defendant’s request, the same “proposition applies
with equal force in the context of providing counsel to protect an accused’s
Fifth Amendment privilege in the face of interrogation. Although the role of
counsel at trial differs from the role during interrogation, the differences are
not relevant to the question whether a request is a prerequisite.”).
40
Id. at 444.
41
Id. at 471–72. The majority recognized some flexibility, noting “We cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular
solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process.” Id. at 467.
42
Id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting in three cases and concurring in one)
(“The ipse dixit of the majority has no support in our cases.”); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he decision
of the Court represents poor constitutional law . . .”); id. at 526 (White, J.,
dissenting) (“The proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination
forbids in custody interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority opinion and without a clear waiver of counsel has no significant support
in the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth Amendment.”).
43
See id. at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the new rules requiring a right to counsel during custodial interrogations “derive from quotation and analogy drawn from precedents under the Sixth Amendment . . .”).
44
Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
45
Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504, 505 (1966).
47
See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing
impeachment exception for perjured testimony); see infra note 52.
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Harris, 401 U.S. at 222.
49
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that Miranda would be “perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.”).
50
See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (distinguishing a selfincriminating confession from the fruits of such evidence).
51
See id. at 452 (reversing the exclusion of testimony because “[i]t does
not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused
in the prosecution’s case in chief is barred for all purposes”); see also
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643-44 (2004) (refusing to exclude
a weapon recovered after the defendant voluntarily made a statement about
that weapon because it was non-testimonial despite the fact that the case
was decided after Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), which
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characterized the Miranda rule as a constitutional requirement); Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (refusing to exclude a statement made
after suspect was given Miranda warnings when police failed to tell the
suspect that a prior statement made before the Miranda warnings could not
be used against the suspect).
52
New York v. Quarles, 497 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (“[T]he need for
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61
Id. at 653.
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63
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66
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67
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71
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72
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74
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75
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18 U.S.C. § 3501(a).
85
See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999)
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(2001).
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Amendment, 68 Brook. l. rev. 241, 271 (2002) [hereinafter Darmer, Lessons].
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See id. (noting that the majority of the Dickerson Court upheld the
constitutionality of Miranda while at the same time sustaining cases based
on the view that Miranda was merely prophylactic).
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Id. (suggesting the Court must reevaluate Dickerson to have “an internally consistent Miranda and confessions law jurisprudence” because of the
inherent conflict of claiming that Miranda is constitutionally required yet
perpetuating exceptions based on the premise that it is merely prophylactic).
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See United States v. Luker, 395 F. 3d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 2005)
(affirming the district court’s application of the exception); United States v.
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United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1989).
110
Id. at 379.
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Id. at 384, 384 n.4.
114
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United States v. Liddell, 517 F.3d 1007, 1011 (8th Cir. 2008)
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138
See id. (discussing the inapplicability of the exception in Orozoco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 324 (1969), saying “[T]he Quarles Court did not
indicate that the inherent danger of a trained police officer discovering a
weapon by itself was sufficient to justify the application of the exception.”).
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him, four hours after a murder had been committed, to interrogate him
about whether he had been present at the scene of the shooting whether he
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1994), which reiterated the narrowness of the public safety exception when
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144
United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1201–02 (10th Cir. 2009)
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145
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146
United States v. Talley, 275 F.3d 560, 564 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing and
remanding the district court’s decision to grant a motion to suppress evidence
of weapons because officers’ quick entry during execution of a search warrant was justified as a protective sweep of a dark apartment when police
heard sounds of unsecured individuals running and saw shadowy figures).
147
See Williams, 483 F.3d at 428–29; see e.g., United States v. Kellogg, 306
Fed. App’x 916, 924 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding reason to believe the defendant
had a weapon where he was suspected of a recent armed bank robbery).
148
Infra notes 152–53.
149
Williams, 483 F.3d at 429.
150
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Id. at 691.
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Id. at 693.
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United States v. Williams, 483 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir. 2007).
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Mobley, 40 F.3d at 693 n.2.
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Id. at 693.
157
United States v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589 (5th Cir.1989).
158
Id. at 591–92.
159
Id. at 592.
160
Id.
161
See id. at 595 (noting that the vehicle where the gun was located had
already been seized by the police officers when they inquired about and
subsequently found the firearm).
162
Id. (finding difficulty applying the public safety exception but noting
no violation because the officers would have found the gun incident to
lawful search of the car during arrest).
163
See United States v. Brathwaite, 458 F.3d 376, 382 n.8 (5th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Fleming v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)).
164
United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 2005).
165
Id. at 606.
166
Id. at 608 (outlining defendant DeJesus’ convictions, which included
conspiracy with intent to distribute 1,000 grams of heroin and fifty grams
of crack cocaine).
167
Id. at 608–09 (noting that on appeal, the government conceded these
statements were made in response to questions posed by another officer and
without Miranda warnings).
168
Id. at 612–13 (citing such factors as officers’ first-hand knowledge
of defendant’s past drug convictions and intelligence from a confidential
informant).
169
See id. (stating that “the fact that another person was present in
the apartment at the time of [the defendant’s] arrest contributed to and
compounded the threat the officers faced . . .”); see also United States
v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 678 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding immediacy where
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three people were present in an apartment with a missing weapon); United
States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 153–54 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding immediacy
during the apprehension of the defendant caught in a drug transaction in the
afternoon across the street from a school).
170
FBI Memorandum, supra note 17.
171
United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing police concern during an investigation of a bomb plot revealed by an
informant, which yielded a bag containing five pipe bombs after the switch
on one had already been flipped).
172
Id. at 121.
173
United States v. Jones, 154 F. Supp. 2d 617, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2001.)
174
Id. at 628 (addressing the issue of the magnitude later in the opinion,
Judge Lynch called Khalil “the extreme” situation under a Quarles analysis
and found that “no rational person” would expect officers faced with a
potentially live bomb to provide Miranda warnings to a suspect before
questioning him about the bomb).
175
See United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 384 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding it appropriate for an officer to ask about weapons when dealing with
suspected drug dealers who are “known to arm themselves . . .”); see also
United States v. Williams, 483 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing cases
where courts applied the exception because police had knowledge that
suspects’ were “capable of violence . . .”).
176
United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (decided
February 18, 1994); United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688 (4th Cir.1994)
(decided November 23, 1994); United States v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589 (5th
Cir.1989) (decided April 27, 1989); Fleming v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1109
(5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (decided March 6, 1992); Khalil, 214 F.3d at 111
(decided May 31, 2000).
177
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing impeachment
for perjured testimony).
178
See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 637 (2004) (holding that
physical evidence derived from unwarned but voluntary statements need
not be suppressed because the Miranda rule is about Self-Incrimination
rather than constraining police conduct); but see Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604
(applying an exclusionary rule to unwarned but voluntary statements repeated after Miranda warnings).
179
United States v. Hensel, 509 F.Supp. 1364, 1372 (1981) (ruling there is
no Miranda issue where “United States agents do not actively participate in
the arrest and interrogation . . .”).
180
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 686 (in that case, exigency established by presence
of weapon near defendant at time of arrest).
181
Harris, 401 U.S. at 226 (allowing impeachment to avoid misuse of the
Miranda rights).
182
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476–77.
183
Id. at 477.
184
See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (holding prosecution
could use such statements to impeach credibility of defendant’s testimony).
185
Id.
186
Id. (noting that defendant testified that his statements were not coerced
and voluntary).
187
Id. at 223.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 225–26 (stating impeachment process “provided valuable aid to
the jury in assessing petitioner’s credibility, and the benefits of this process
should not be lost, in our view, because of the speculative possibility that
impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby”).
190
See e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York:
Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging
Nixon Majority, 80 yale l.J. 1198, 1199 (1971) (arguing that the majority
opinion “in crucial respects, flatly misstates both the record in the case
before it and the state of the law at the time the decision was rendered”
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and “each of the arguments set forth by the Court masks a total absence of
analysis and provides no support for its result.”).
191
See e.g., James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 320 (1990) (upholding right
of prosecution to impeach defendant’s testimony with illegally obtained
statements, but refusing to expand rule to allow use of illegally obtained
statements to impeach other defense witnesses); United States v. Havens,
446 U.S. 620, 626–27 (1980) (holding impeachment proper where defendant, who testified falsely during cross-examination, was impeached with
illegally obtained evidence); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (holding
that where defendant is given full and proper Miranda warnings and then
makes voluntary statements to officers, those statements could be used for
impeachment).
192
New York v. Quarles, 497 U.S. 649, 683 n. 6 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court has not waivered from the position
that statements made during custodial interrogation, and without Miranda
warnings, were inadmissible and that the Harris exception allowed them
to be considered for credibility and not guilt).
193
Compare People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212, 1219 (Cal. 1998) (accepting
impeachment use despite “a calculated and purposeful violation” of the
Miranda rule) with Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1028–29 (9th Cir.
1999) (suggesting that because “the officers set out deliberately to violate
a suspect’s Miranda rights,” the resulting statement was not admissible for
impeachment).
194
See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 631 (2004) (saying “statements taken without Miranda warnings (though not actually compelled)
can be used to impeach a defendant’s testimony at trial” even when the
“fruits of actually compelled testimony cannot . . .”). The impeachment
exception is limited to the defendant’s testimony, and may not be used to
impeach defense witnesses.
195
See e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974) (holding government may use defendant to build its own case, including compelling
defendant to provide physical evidence against himself); Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (finding written confession, given after Miranda
warnings, admissible at trial).
196
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447 (noting the case predated Miranda and the
officers’ actions were properly based on the holding in Escobedo, 378 U.S.
at 478).
197
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 298 (holding that where defendant made voluntary
but unwarned confession to police then later provided a written confession
after receiving Miranda warnings, Fifth Amendment did not require exclusion of written statement at trial).
198
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (declaring
Miranda warnings based on a constitutional right that Congress could
not legislatively circumvent). For a full description of the pre-Dickerson
jurisprudence and the possible future of the derivative evidence exception,
see Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda, 112 yale
l.J. 447, 507–512 (2002)).
199
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 630 (2004).
200
Id. at 635 (recounting officers arrested defendant after receiving tip
from his parole officer that defendant was in possession of a handgun).
201
Id. (noting that defendant was reluctant at first to tell the officer where
the gun was for fear he would take it, eventually told the officer it was in
his bedroom and gave permission for the officer to search the room).
202
Id. at 635–46 (applying instead the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).
203
Id. at 643 (“The admission of such fruit presents no risk that a defendant’s coerced statements (however defined) will be used against him at a
criminal trial.”).
204
Id. at 638 (reasoning that physical evidence cannot violate the Fifth
Amendment concerns “compelled testimony”).
205
Id. at 637 (quoting United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2000)
(noting that the word “witness” in the Self-Incrimination Clause “limits the
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relevant category of compelled incriminating communications to those that
are ‘testimonial’ in character . . .”)).
206
Id. at 641–42.
207
Id. at 637. See e.g., Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 35 (discussing why compelled
blood samples and other examples do not violate the Clause); Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985) (saying, “[t]he Fifth Amendment, of
course, is not concerned with nontestimonial evidence.”).
208
Patane, 542 U.S. at 640.
209
Id. at 644 (“And although it is true that the Court requires the exclusion
of the physical fruit of actually coerced statements, it must be remembered
that statements taken without sufficient Miranda warnings are presumed to
have been coerced only for certain purposes and then only when necessary
to protect the privilege against self-incrimination.”).
210
See U.s. Const, amend. V (stating “No person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . .”) (emphasis added);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (holding that admitting
coerced statements was a clear denial of due process required by Fourteenth
Amendment).
211
United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (deciding on the admissibility of witness testimony the government gained
through conceded coercion).
212
Id. at 264.
213
Id. at 267 (discussing that defendant was imprisoned at a secret site
where he was subjected to extremely harsh interrogation methods as part of
the CIA’s “Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program;” the government stipulated all statements obtained were in violation of Fifth and Sixth
Amendments).
214
Id. at 287–88 (“If the government is going to coerce a detainee
to provide information to our intelligence agencies, it may not use that
evidence—or fruits of that evidence that are tied as closely to the coerced
statements as [the witness’] testimony would be here—to prosecute the
detainee for a criminal offense.”).
215
Id. at 265 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, to support the possibility of the very narrow exception needed for the government’s attenuation
argument to prevail).
216
See Memorandum from Sarah Miller, Harvard Nat’l Sec. Research
Comm., to Professor Philip Heymann, The Application of Miranda in
Overseas Contexts, (May 2009), available at www.law.harvard.edu/
students/orgs/nsrc/miranda101309.pdf (“Courts faced with the question
have overwhelmingly held that most, if not all, of Miranda’s warnings are
required for overseas interrogations to be admissible.”). For the custodial
interrogation requirement, see United States v. Suchit, 480 F. Supp. 2d 39,
54 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that because the defendant was not in custody
at the time of FBI interviews taking place in Trinidad, “no Miranda warnings were required to render the statements admissible at the trial of this
matter.”).
217
See e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa,
552 F.3d 177, 202 (2d Cir. 2008) (suggesting that Miranda as applied to
overseas interrogations may not require the full panoply of warnings);
United States v. Heller, 625 F.2d 594, 599–600 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that the exclusionary rule did not apply where U.S. officials’ involvement
in interrogation of defendant captured overseas was minimal); Cranford v.
Rodriguez, 512 F.2d 860, 863 (10th Cir. 1975) (considering a defendant’s
capture and interrogation by U.S. agents in Mexico and deciding that authorities’ failure to mention the right to appointed counsel was a departure
from Miranda that was “unavoidable and not prejudicial.”); United States
v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642, 672 (E.D. Va 2010) (finding that defendant,
charged with piracy, was not adequately advised of his Miranda rights
during his initial questioning on board a frigate off the coast of Somalia
but that subsequent warnings and a “cleansing statement” made his statements during a later interrogation admissible); United States v. Straker,
596 F. Supp. 2d 80, 93 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that when defendant was

35

interrogated in Trinidad by U.S. agents, he waived his Fifth Amendment
rights when he invoked the right to counsel but later voluntarily initiated
communication with agents).
218
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 146 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing United
States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 712 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1975) (“stating that
if ‘the conduct of foreign police [were] so reprehensible as to shock the
conscience,’ then application of the exclusionary rule might be warranted .
. .”)).
219
See e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings, supra note 217, at 203 (citing Yousef,
327 F.3d at 146, finding the Second Circuit “implicitly adopted” but failed
to define the doctrine which states that evidence derived from Miranda
violations by foreign police must be suppressed when United States agents
are actively involved); but see Pfeifer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d
873, 877 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding joint venture doctrine inapplicable where
the only U.S. involvement was a treaty encouraging Mexico to capture U.S.
citizens who violate its laws); United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d
708, 744 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (finding no involvement by U.S. officials in arrest
and interrogation of defendant by Israeli agents).
220
Pfeifer, supra n. 219, at 877, cert. denied, 447 U.S. 908 (1980). See
e.g., Yousef, 327 F.3d at 145 (stating Miranda does not apply to interrogations conducted overseas by foreign officials without participation by U.S.
personnel); United States v. Yousef, 925 F. Supp. 1063, 1077 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (deciding terrorist suspect had voluntarily waived his rights since
the Philippine police who allegedly tortured him were not acting as U.S.
agents, and he was not subject to coercion by U.S. officials while in U.S.
custody).
221
United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(citing United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972)).
222
Welch, supra note 221, at 213 (finding defendant’s confession to
Bahamian police without Miranda warnings admissible despite FBI agent’s
presence during questioning because Bahamian officials had their own interest in alleged criminal conduct that demonstrated FBI did not use foreign
police to evade Miranda).
223
United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 93 n. 114 (D.D.C. 2006)
(“In the absence of active participation by a United States official in the
evidence-gathering event, a joint venture can only exist when foreign
officials are rendered ‘agents’ of the United States government, or when
the cooperation was designed to evade the constitutional requirements applicable to American investigators.”) (internal citations omitted).
224
United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 228 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding
that FBI did not actively or substantially participate in investigation of an
Al-Qaeda affiliated suspect when Saudi Arabian officials had the final say
on which questions would be asked and FBI agents observed interrogations
from outside the room).
225
Id. at 228 (agreeing that any Miranda error was harmless because the
Saudis showed their own strong interest in the investigation).
226
Id. at 228 (noting, however, that Saudi agents also had the power to
reject the proposed questions from U.S. agents).
227
Id. at 229–30 n. 5.
228
Id. (agreeing with the district court ruling that mere presence of U.S.
officials during interrogation by foreign officials did not make statements
involuntary).
229
Id. at 230 n. 5.
230
United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 230 n. 6 (4th Cir. 2008)
(finding whenever U.S. agents propose questions to ask defendant, and
those questions are asked by foreign officials, U.S. agents engage in
“active” and “substantial” participation of interrogation).
231
Id. at 231 n. 6 (adding “[t]his cannot be the law.”)
232
See Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 182 n. 9 (citing Welch, 455 F.2d
at 213, to show that after finding the exclusionary rule inapplicable where
foreign officers conduct interrogation because it would lack deterrent

36

effect, courts must nevertheless conduct an inquiry into whether statements are involuntary, and thus should be suppressed).
233
Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting United
States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir. 1976)).
234
United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 94 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding,
despite U.S. agents administering Miranda warnings when they took over
interrogations from Rwandan officials, defendant’s statements were involuntary and therefore inadmissible in U.S. courts because of the coercive
nature of Rwandan officials’ interrogations and conditions of confinement).
235
See Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 239 (balancing practical limitations with concerns about the right to confrontation, the court allowed defense counsel to
contemporaneously depose foreign officers and witnesses in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia via video link).
236
See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (holding that defendant’s statements,
made after invocation of right to counsel, were inadmissible at trial and did
not represent waiver of Fifth Amendment rights).
237
See Mobley, 40 F.3d at 692–93 (deciding the Quarles exception
applied where, after being arrested and claiming right to counsel, defendant informed officers of a weapon in a bedroom closet); United States v.
DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1989) (asserting the Quarles exception and right of officers to question defendants about matters relating to
officers’ safety made defendant’s statements, and weapon recovered as a
result, admissible despite defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel).
238
DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 538 (decided March 1989).
239
United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989).
240
Id. at 537 (noting defendant was free on appellant bond following
convictions for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to
distribute heroin in 1984).
241
Id. (acknowledging a discrepancy between officers’ testimony that
defendant asked only for a phone book from which to retrieve his attorney’s
number, whereas defendant claimed he made request to contact attorney
immediately upon arrest).
242
Id. (providing context for the request, the court noted this occurred after
defendant was told he would be going to court and while he was wearing
jogging pants and no shoes).
243
Id. (establishing that officers did recover a .38 caliber revolver from the
closet).
244
Id. at 538.
245
United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1989).
246
See id. (concluding his constitutional rights had not been violated when
the officers acted lawfully in pursuit of safety).
247
United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 688 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussing
officers executing an arrest warrant who confronted a defendant in his
home when there was a weapon nearby).
248
Id. at 690 (detailing that in this case, the defendant similarly needed to
leave the room to change, but was not asked about a weapon beforehand).
249
Id.
250
Id. at 691 (implicating safety concerns for officers who would remain
in the apartment to complete the search after defendant’s removal from the
premises).
251
Id. (admitting the gun because of the public safety exception).
252
See id. at 693 (finding insufficient justification for the exception on
grounds of officer safety, but finding admission of gun at trial was harmless
since its discovery was inevitable).
253
United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 693 (4th Cir. 1994).
254
See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 352 (1990) (reaffirming the
impeachment use of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda rights by
admitting a written statement given to police after they refused defendant’s request for an attorney); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975)
(admitting statements made after invocation of right to counsel to impeach
defendant’s trial testimony).

Spring 2012

Hass, 420 U.S. at 722 (concluding the impeachment material would aid
the jury in assessing the defendant’s credibility).
256
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 344 (1990).
257
Id. at 352.
258
For normative positions on the extension of a public safety exception in
Edwards situations, compare Darmer, supra note 101 with Timothy Salter,
Last Prophylactic Standing: Why the Quarles’ “Public-Safety Exception”
Should Not Be Expanded to Excuse Edwards Violations that Occur During
Exigent “Public Safety” Circumstances, 25 st. John’s J. C.r. & eCon.
dev. 379 (2011).
259
United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2000).
260
Id.
261
ChristoPher diCkey, seCUring the City: inside ameriCa’s Best
CoUnterterror forCe — the nyPd 65 (2009) (providing an account of
the way Mossabah repeated the word “bomba” to the officers and emulated
explosion noises).
262
Khalil, 214 F.3d at 115.
263
Id. (describing the scuffle that ensued after two officers entered the
bedroom where the defendants were hiding).
264
diCkey, supra note 261 (reporting that the first officer through the door
shot Abu Mezer twice, one round grazing his face and the other in the
midsection, and Khalil once. The second officer shot each man one
additional time.).
265
United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2000).
266
Id. (explaining that Abu Mezer told officers he had made five bombs
and that they would explode when all four switches were flipped).
267
Id.
268
Id. at 115–16 (observing that questions in the afternoon focused on his
general motivations for the bombing and more details about his plan).
269
Id. at 116 (reciting the facts, the court noted that “He said, inter alia,
that he had made the bombs, ‘want[ing] to blow up a train and kill as many
Jews as possible’ because he opposed United States support for Israel. Abu
Mezer also stated that he was ‘with Hamas’, a terrorist organization, and
had planned to bomb the ‘B’ subway train at 8 a.m. on July 31 because
there were ‘a lot of Jews who ride that train’. Questioned as to where he
had bought the bomb components, Abu Mezer said he had purchased gunpowder at a gun shop in North Carolina. He had used it to make the bombs
found in the raid and had been planning to make one additional bomb in
the future.” (citations omitted)).
270
Id.
271
United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2000) (focusing
primarily on challenges to several photographs of him which tended to
show his association with an extremist lifestyle).
272
Id. (believing that consideration to be an important justifying factor
in rejecting the defendant’s contention that the question was unrelated to
public safety).
273
Id. (finding admission of the statements, even if not covered by the
public safety exception, was harmless error) (cert. denied in Abu Mezer v.
United States, 531 U.S. 937 (2000)).
274
United States v. Jones, 154 F. Supp. 2d 617, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(suggesting there should be little doubt regarding whether public safety
was at issue).
275
Id. at 628.
276
Indictment at 1, United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 2:10-cr-20005
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2010) [hereinafter “Abdulmutallab Indictment”] (noting
defendant was on Northwest flight 253).
277
Id.
278
Id. at 2 (stating the bomb was concealed in his clothing and consisted
of mixture of PETN, TATP, and other ingredients).
279
Criminal Complaint at 2, United States v. Abdulmutallab, No.
2:09-cr-30526 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 26, 2009) [hereinafter “Abdulmutallab
255

Criminal Law Brief

Complaint”] (detailing how passengers and flight crew described his
suspicious behavior to agents).
280
Id. (noting that before covering himself with the blanket and initiating
the device, the defendant stated his stomach was upset).
281
Id. (recounting that passengers used blankets and extinguishers to put
out the fire).
282
Id.
283
Id. (reporting that Customs and Border Protection officials determined
defendant needed medical attention, and sent him to University of Michigan
Medical Center).
284
Savage, supra note 14 (arguing the Abdulmutallab incident was an
example of federal agents pushing the bounds of when Miranda rights must
be read to terror suspects).
285
Serrano & Savage, supra note 11 (showing justification for ongoing
concern for public safety).
286
Savage, supra note 14 (showing no indication that this cooperation was
involuntary through the surgery).
287
Serrano & Savage, supra note 11 (recounting agents’ belief that
defendant had simply had a change of mind).
288
Ed Henry, White House Reveals Secret Cooperation with AbdulMutallab
Family, CNN, (Feb. 3, 2010), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/
02/plane.bomb.suspect/ (explaining that the meeting was intended to gain
family’s help in convincing defendant to cooperate).
289
Id.
290
Id. (failing to resolve the question whether administration officials
provided additional Miranda warnings before subsequent interrogations).
291
The Associated Press, Michigan: Man Accused in Bomb Plot is Allowed
to Be His Own Lawyer, n.y. times, (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/09/14/us/14brfs-MANACCUSEDIN_BRF.html (reporting that
court did order a standby lawyer to be available to provide defendant
advice).
292
Abdulmutallab Indictment, supra note 276; Abdulmutallab Complaint,
supra note 279.
293
Complaint, United States v. Faisal Shahzad, No. 1:10-mj-00928-UA
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2010) [hereinafter “Shahzad Complaint”] (revealing
discovery was made by a witness who summoned a mounted police officer
regarding a suspicious vehicle, the Pathfinder, which was unoccupied and
running).
294
Id. at 4.
295
Id. at 5 (saying that on seeing smoke, the first officer on scene called
for backup and began evacuating the area).
296
Id. at 8.
297
Id. at 9 (noting defendant was attempting to travel to Dubai).
298
Savage, supra note 14.
299
Stephanie Condon, Faisal Shahzad Was Read Miranda Rights After
Initial Questioning, CBs neWs (May 4, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.
com/8301-503544_162-20004108-503544.html.
300
Baker, supra note 1 (reporting agents decision to handle defendant as a
civilian prompted the reading of his rights).
301
Condon, supra note 299 (quoting former Deputy Director of the FBI,
John S. Pistole).
302
Shahzad Complaint, at 9.
303
Id.
304
Mark Mazzetti et. al, Suspect, Charged, Said to Admit to Role in
Plot, n.y. times May 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/
nyregion/05bomb.html?hp (revealing officials were investigating possible
links between Shahzad and the Pakistani Taliban).
305
Andrew C. McCarthy, Why Was the Shahzad Complaint Made
Public?, national revieW online (May 5, 2010, 6:17 PM), http://www.
nationalreview.com/corner/198991/why-was-shahzad-complaint-madepublic-andrew-c-mccarthy (criticizing the government for compromising
what could have been a useful secret source of intelligence because the

37

public complaint allowed an easy inference that Shahzad is cooperating
with authorities).
306
Government’s Memorandum in Connection with the Sentencing
of Faisal Shahzad at 2, United States v. Faisal Shahzad, No. 1:10-cr-00541MGC (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010).
307
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Faisal Shahzad Pleads Guilty in
Manhattan Federal Court to 10 Federal Crimes, (June 21, 2010), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-ag-721.html (reporting the
guilty plea came less than two months after arrest).
308
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 yale l.J. 2137,
2189 (2002) (voicing the need to treat terrorists differently than ordinary
criminals).
309
Id.
310
See United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2000)
(providing statements before and after Miranda warnings regarding bomb
placement, function, and his motivations); Savage, supra note 14 (noting
that Abdulmutallab voluntarily participated in interrogation for almost an
hour, and Shazad for several hours, before being given Miranda warnings).
311
Khalil, 214 F.3d at 115–16 (revealing the only question the defendant
did not answer directly was whether or not he intended to kill himself in
the bombing).
312
Savage, supra note 14 (reporting defendant’s cooperation stopped,
at least momentarily, after his surgery).
313
See id. (failing to specify how the relatives convinced him to cooperate
or why the defendant changed his mind).
314
Shahzad Complaint, at 9 (defendant Savage admitting his role in the
failed bombing and possibly provided actionable intelligence that led to
several arrests in Pakistan).
315
Ctr on laW and seC., n.y. Univ. sChool of laW, terrorist trial
rePort Card: sePt. 11, 2001-sePt. 11, 2010 4 (2010), available at http://
www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/documents/01_TTRC2010Final1.pdf
(specifying 688 prosecutions have been resolved of the 998 indicted cases).
316
Id. (noting, for example, the Report Card indicates they found thirtyeight known cooperators in the Terrorist Trial Database. While this is a
small percentage of the entire dataset (4.6% of all defendants, and 5.5%
of the non-list defendants), they appear in 12% of non-list cases. Ctr on
laW and seC., n.y. Univ. sChool of laW, Terrorist Trial Report Card:
Sept. 11, 2001-Sept. 11, 2019 44 (January 2010), available at http://
www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/documents/02_TTRCFinalJan142.pdf/
(reporting non-list cases exclude cases in which researchers were not
able to identify an association with terrorism other than inclusion on a
Department of Justice list).
317
New York v. Quarles, 497 U.S. 649, 686 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (calling the majority’s rule “a serious loss [to] the administration of
justice . . .”).
318
Id. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U.S. 545 (1977)).
319
See e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 631 (2004) (plurality
opinion) (“[V]iolations [of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination] occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements
into evidence at trial.”); Chavez, 538 U.S. at 769 (plurality opinion) (holding the alleged coercive questioning of the suspect, including failure to
read Miranda rights, did not violate Self-Incrimination Clause of Fifth
Amendment, absent use of suspect’s compelled statements in criminal case
against him); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)
(“[A] violation [of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination]
occurs only at trial.”).
320
See e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552
F.3d 177, 203 n. 19 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that application of Miranda to
overseas detainees would not hinder intelligence gathering); United States v.
Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 189 n. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating holding

38

not intended to hinder intelligence gathering by authorized officials, but only
to limit use of non-Mirandized statements at domestic trial).
321
Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
322
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 687, n. 9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
323
Khalil, 214 F.3d at 115–16 (recall defendant only objected to admission
of his statement indicating he wanted to die in the blast, not statements
regarding operation of the bombs themselves).
324
Abdulmutallab Complaint, at 2 (noting officers also discovered a
partially melted syringe that, based on witness statements, they believed
the defendant used to initiate the device.).
325
Shahzad Complaint, at 6–8 (detailing that in addition to that evidence,
officers also had witness statements from the dealership that sold the
Pathfinder used in the failed bombing, vehicle registration information
for that vehicle as well as another vehicle known to belong to Faisal
Shazad, and statements from witnesses who saw bomb making materials
in Shazad’s home).
326
See e.g., Patane, 542 U.S. at 644 (refusing suppression of physical
fruits of defendant’s unwarned statements); Harris, 401 U.S. at 226 (admitting unwarned statements for impeachment at trial); Yousef, 327 F.3d at
146 (discussing statements to foreign officials and joint venture doctrine);
United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 694 (4th Cir. 1994) (harmless
error); DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 541 (holding the public safety exception
applies, even to statements made after assertion of Sixth Amendment right
to counsel).
327
Regarding the likelihood of such a change, Philip B. Heymann states
that the Supreme Court would be likely to uphold a broader emergency
exception for terrorism cases, especially with Congressional approval.
Serrano & Savage, supra note 11 (inferring that “Not having addressed
how long the emergency exception can be, the Supreme Court would be
very hesitant to disagree with both the president and Congress if there was
any reasonable resolution to that question.”).
328
United States v. Jones, 154 F. Supp. 2d 617, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(noting that “Such an exception, however, does not accord officers an automatic right to interrogate suspects simply because it is possible that firearms
are present at the arrest scene. In the context of searches for weapons, this
doctrine requires, at a minimum, that the authorities have some real basis to
believe that weapons are present, and some specific reason to believe that the
weapon’s undetected presence poses a danger to the police or to the public.”).
329
Quarles, 497 U.S. at 656.
330
Id. at 659, n. 8 (distinguishing Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969)).
331
Id. at 658.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Elizabeth Nielsen received her J.D. degree from
Yale Law School in 2011. During law school, she worked
in the Department of Justice Counterterrorism Section,
the U.S. Attorney’s Office in New Haven, Connecticut,
and the Documentation Center of Cambodia in Phnom
Penh. She is currently interning in WilmerHale’s London
office. In the coming year, she will be an intern in the
Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and will then clerk
for the Honorable James E. Baker on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces. She would like to thank
Professor Kate Stith for her advice and support.

Spring 2012

